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Comment
DAN REYNOLDS*
Predatory Lending in Oregon: Does
Oregon Need an Anti-Predatory
Lending Law, or Do Current
Laws and Remedies Suffice?
Predatory lending has recently emerged as a significant socialissue throughout the United States.1  Specifically in Oregon,
certain homeowners risk losing their homes and financial security
because of manipulative lending practices that entice unsophisti-
cated borrowers to obtain high-cost loans.2  Most of these prac-
tices, while unethical and clearly abusive, unfortunately are not
illegal.  In response, consumer groups have supported legislation
that would tighten the interest rate and fee triggers that define
high-cost loans, improve protections for borrowers receiving such
loans by prohibiting the financing of exorbitant fees, and protect
consumers’ rights to seek redress by prohibiting mandatory
arbitration.3
In 2001, Oregon State Representative Carolyn Tomei spon-
sored a similar bill for Oregon.4  That bill failed to pass, most
* B.A., cum laude , Washington University in St. Louis, 2000; candidate for J.D.,
University of Oregon School of Law, 2005.  I would like to thank Professor Steven
Bender for his valuable assistance and feedback with this Comment.
1 See generally  Eric Stein, Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending
23, at  http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf (July 25, 2001) (ex-
plaining the cost of predatory lending on American homeowners).
2 Hearing on H.B. 3088 Before the House Comm. on Bus., Lab. and Consumer
Aff ., 2003 Leg., 72nd Sess. (Or. 2003) [hereinafter Hearing on H.B. 3088] (statement
of Peg Malloy, Executive Dir., Portland Hous. Ctr.).
3 See id . (statement of Pegge McGuire, Executive Dir., Fair Hous. Council of
Oregon).
4 Id . (statement of Rep. Carolyn Tomei).
[1081]
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likely because of the uncertain effects its restrictions would have
had on the credit market.5  A realistic solution, therefore, must
be proposed to protect vulnerable Oregonians from abusive
loans.  The current debate focuses on how to prohibit predatory
lenders from using abusive tactics, like excessive loan fees, large
“balloon” payments, high interest rates, and frequent refinances,
without severely impeding legitimate lenders’ efforts to extend
credit to those in need.6
Supporters of statutes that would forbid misleading lending
practices believe the government should protect cash-poor, eq-
uity-rich senior citizens and low-income minorities because these
borrowers are commonly targeted and generally disconnected
from the credit market.7  Opponents of such legislation argue
that existing remedies suffice and question the actual number of
predatory lending occurences.8  Opponents also assert that un-
necessary legislation will force legitimate lenders out of certain
jurisdictions because of the increased costs and the risk of the
penalties involved in ensuring compliance with more legislation.9
This Comment continues in four parts.  Part I defines “preda-
tory lending” and gives an overview of the problems associated
with predatory lending practices.  Part II provides an assessment
of the current notable federal and state laws and discusses the
possibility and impact of federal preemption.  Part III analyzes
the existing Oregon laws aimed at limiting unethical lending
practices and contends that these laws are insufficient.  Finally,
Part IV argues that a remedy that does not include additional
legislation is inadequate, and advocates for a system of reasona-
ble, clear, and comprehensible rules that could afford significant
and necessary protection to all borrowers.
5 Id . (statement of Jim Markee, Or. Mortgage Lenders Ass’n).
6 See  Deborah Goldstein, Protecting Consumers From Predatory Lenders: Defin-
ing the Problem and Moving Toward Workable Solutions , 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 225, 226-28 & 232-34 (2000).
7 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:  The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending , 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1281-82 (2002).
8 See Hearing on H.B. 3088 , supra  note 2 (statement of Jim Markee, Or. Mort-
gage Lenders Ass’n)
9 Patricia E. Obara, Predatory Lending , 118 BANKING L.J. 541, 541-42 (2001).
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I
OVERVIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING
A. The Difference Between Subprime Lending and
Predatory Lending
Subprime lending is the extension of credit to higher-risk bor-
rowers who do not qualify for traditional, prime loans made at
the prevailing interest rates.10  Subprime lenders convince bor-
rowers to take out home equity or home refinance loans to con-
solidate consumer debts by using the tax advantage associated
with home loans.11  For legitimate reasons, these loans have
higher interest rates to compensate for the potentially greater
risk that the borrowers represent.12  However, these loans are
not necessarily predatory.  Predatory loans, those addressed in
this Comment, make up a subset of subprime loans, and only re-
sult when lenders exploit unsophisticated and vulnerable borrow-
ers with unquestionably predatory practices.13
Predatory lending, theoretically, may be a component in any
loan where the borrower’s fees are not justified when compared
to the lender’s additional cost and risk.14  These loans have one
or more of the following features: (1) they charge more in inter-
est and fees than is required to cover the added risk of lending to
borrowers with credit imperfections; (2) they contain abusive
terms and conditions that trap borrowers and lead to increased
indebtedness; (3) they fail to take into account the borrower’s
ability to repay the loan; or (4) they require borrowers to waive
meaningful legal redress.15  Therefore, predatory lending has
been defined as “a catalogue of onerous lending practices, which
are often targeted at vulnerable populations and result in devas-
tating personal losses, including bankruptcy, poverty, and
foreclosure.”16
10 Predatory Mortgage Lending:  Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Fin. Servs. , 106th Cong. 308-19 (2000) (testimony of Donna Tanoue, Chairman,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
11 See  Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1263-65.
12 Id . at 1261.
13 Id .
14 See  Obara, supra  note 9, at 544-45.
15 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1260.
16 Id .
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B. Who is at Risk?
The victims of predatory lending are susceptible to these tac-
tics because they are disconnected from the credit market and
uneducated about their options.17  They are often lower- to mid-
dle-income elderly or minorities who, because of credit rationing,
discrimination, and other social forces, have not had experience
with legitimate lenders.18  When many of these elderly home-
owners are confronted with large and unexpected emergency
bills, their only option is to access the home equity that they have
spent their lives accumulating.19  Their limited knowledge about
financing alternatives makes them easy prey for predatory lend-
ers.20  One study found that borrowers sixty-five years of age or
older were three times more likely to hold a subprime mortgage
than borrowers under thirty-five years of age.21
Many minority homeowners are left out of the home-mortgage
market because of discrimination and credit rationing.22  Sub-
prime lenders are involved in 51% of all refinance loans made in
predominantly African-American neighborhoods, compared to
just 9% in predominantly white neighborhoods.23  Minorities
need credit, but are often unaware of or uneducated about the
less expensive alternatives and unable to comprehend the
lender’s loan documents.24  Predatory lenders take advantage of
such information disparities and convince borrowers from the
targeted groups to commit to loans with unsavory terms.25
Predatory lenders can easily identify and target cash-poor eld-
erly and lower income minorities.26  For example, lenders can go
to the local tax office to find out which homeowners have out-
17 Id . at 1279-80.
18 See Hearing on H.B. 3088 , supra  note 2 (statement of Rep. Carolyn Tomei).
19 Id .
20 Id .
21 NEAL WALTERS & SHARON HERMANSON, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., SUB-
PRIME MORTGAGE LENDING AND OLDER BORROWERS (2001), (Pub. No. DD57),
available at  http://research.aarp.org/consume/dd57_lending.html (last visited Mar.
10, 2005).
22 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1280.
23 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV.,
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 23 (2000),
available at  http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY REPORT].
24 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1280-81.
25 Id . at 1281.
26 Id . at 1282.
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standing taxes and are in need of money.27  Predatory lenders
can also discover which homeowners have been cited for hous-
ing-code violations and are in need of home-repair loans.28
When a naı¨ve borrower is identified, predatory lenders often co-
erce their victim to commit to loans under the false belief that
this will be the victim’s one and only chance to borrow.29  In the
end, the victims of predatory lending sign complex mortgages
without having a clear understanding of the terms or the risks
they have acquired.
C. What Lending Practices Cause Problems?
Predatory lending is particularly devastating because subprime
borrowers typically seek home equity loans at a time of great
financial need, when they are in the weakest bargaining position
and most susceptible to practices that can strip them of substan-
tial sums of money and, ultimately, their homes.30  Four main
problems arise from predatory loans: (1) abusive tactics, like “as-
set-based lending,” “loan flipping,” and attaching “balloon” pay-
ments, that seriously harm uneducated borrowers; (2) harmful
rent-seeking; (3) fraudulent loans and loans involving omissions;
and (4) loans that bar the plaintiff from seeking judicial redress.31
The first predatory lending problem involves lenders who use
abusive, unconventional tactics that harm vulnerable borrowers.
One example is when lenders make unaffordable loans based on
the assets of the borrower instead of the borrower’s ability to
repay the obligation (a practice known as “asset-based lend-
ing”).32  Such loans are intended to fail.  They often cause bor-
rowers to lose their home through foreclosure or by signing over
27 Id .
28 Id . at 1282-83.
29 Id . at 1283.
30 See, e.g. , Fred R. Bleakley, A 125% Solution to Card Debt Stirs Worry:  Second-
Mortgage Trend May Signal Economic Trouble , WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at A2
(discussing a family that encumbered its home for more than its value to pay off
credit card debt).
31 Lynne F. Riley, The Bankruptcy Perspective:  Predatory Lending in the Home
Mortgage Market , at  http://www.abiworld.org/Template.cfm?section =200336&tem-
plate=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPUD=5&contentID=1848 (last vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2005).
32 MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, BEST PRACTICES/LEGISLA-
TIVE GUIDELINES:  SUBPRIME LENDING, LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES 6 (advising
against lending without regard to repayment ability), available at  http://
www.mbaa.org/resident/ lib2000/0525b.html (last visited July 29, 2004).
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the deed to the lender in lieu of foreclosure.33  The lender can
then make a profit by reselling the property.
Asset-based lending often results in another unethical practice
known as “loan flipping.”34  Loan flipping occurs when a lender
induces a cash-poor homeowner to refinance a mortgage with a
new, larger loan designed to both pay off the previous loan and
finance the fees and costs of the new loan.35  Initially, this proce-
dure is attractive to borrowers because it offers temporary relief
in the form of lower monthly payments by extending the loan
maturities.36  But, in the end, unattainable payments will cause
the borrower to owe a higher total principal and interest to the
lenders.37  The owners’ home equity will decline as a result of
each refinancing38 and as their equity is stripped and total loan
balances rise, the borrowers’ ability to refinance with legitimate
lenders plummets.  Ultimately, the borrowers give away their eq-
uity and default.39
Another abusive tactic involves lenders who persuade home-
owners to refinance no-interest or low-interest mortgages at
higher interest rates.40  Because high interest rates entail large
monthly payments to lower the loan principal,41 predatory lend-
ers often design these loans with lower monthly payments, but
attach a large “balloon” payment that is due at the end of the
loan term.42  It is certainly possible that the balloon payment that
is required at the end of the loan term could exceed the price of
the original loan.  For example, a borrower who originally enters
into a loan of $33,800 at an interest rate of 16.46% could be pay-
ing monthly payments of $462 per month for 180 months.  Thus,
the total amount of the repayments is $83,160, which includes a
balloon payment of $35,000 (more than the original loan).
The second predatory lending problem arises when subprime
lenders abuse their market power by charging rates and fees that
33 See  Engle & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1264.
34 See  Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2005).
35 Id .
36 See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra  note 24, at 91-92. R
37 Id .
38 Id .
39 See generally  Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection
Laws , 77 VA. L. REV. 489 (1991) (reviewing the costs associated with foreclosure).
40 Riley, supra  note 32. R
41 Hillary B. Miller, Payday Loans and Predatory Lending , 1242 PRACTISING L.
INST. 113, 126-27 (2001).
42 Id .
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are far higher than those in a competitive market, a practice
known as “rent-seeking.”43  Rent-seeking has two common char-
acteristics: (1) the fees are significantly higher than those charged
on conventional loans; and (2) the fees are financed as part of the
loan.44  When these fees are combined with prepayment penal-
ties, for example, a homeowner’s equity will likely be ruined.45
Consider a family that wishes to borrow $40,000 against its
$75,000 house.  A predatory lender presents a home equity loan
that includes fees of $10,000.  If the family cannot pay the $10,000
up-front, the fee is added to the loan balance, which increases it
to $50,000.  Assume also that the loan contains a $5,000 prepay-
ment penalty.  Immediately after the loan closes, it calls for
$55,000 to pay off the $40,000 loan.  The family’s equity is lost.
The third form of predatory lending involves fraud and mis-
leading omissions.  Predatory lenders might use fraud or decep-
tion to hide the reality of the loan obligation from an
unsuspecting borrower.46  Although all fraudulent practices are
violations of existing laws, such as state fraud statutes and the
federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA),47 lenders still attempt to
deceive borrowers by including fraudulent disclosures, failing to
disclose required information, and using bait-and-switch tactics
in the loans.48  In 2000, The Oregonian  published a story regard-
ing the fraud issues in the sale of manufactured housing in Ore-
gon.49  It found that lenders regularly avoid paying the minimum
5% down payment for manufactured home loans.50  The Oregon
Attorney General, in response, encouraged the development of
new fraud deterrents in the state law, and recommended stan-
dardized itemization of all costs, a “cooling off” period, and bet-
ter information so consumers could get a second opinion
regarding their loan.51
43 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 315-22 (Pe-
ter Newman ed., 1998) (commenting that “[r]ent seeking is unproductive; it destroys
value by wasting valuable resources”).
44 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1265-66.
45 See id .
46 Id . at 1267.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000).
48 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1267.
49 Kathy Mitchell, In Over Our Heads:  Predatory Lending and Fraud in Manufac-
tured Housing , CONSUMERS UNION SOUTHWEST REGIONAL OFFICE PUB. POL’Y SE-
RIES, Feb. 2002, Vol. 5, No. 1, at 15, available at  http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/
mh/over/ report.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
50 Id .
51 Id .
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 8 24-MAR-05 13:33
1088 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
In an attempt to mislead borrowers, lenders will also purposely
omit two key figures: the cost of credit as a dollar amount (the
“finance charge”), and the cost as an annual percentage rate
(APR).52  The finance charge measures the total cost of credit in
dollars, including interest payments, points, and origination
fees.53  The APR provides another measure of total credit costs
by converting the lump-sum finance charge into an effective in-
terest rate per year.54  Lenders have also failed to provide con-
sumers with adequate disclosures about closing costs for
mortgages and prepayment penalties.55  In traditional prime mar-
kets, competitive forces are generally sufficient to force lenders
to disclose most lending terms.56  However, in the predatory
lending market, disclosures are usually incomprehensible, and
market forces do not provide adequate constraints.57
The fourth problem of predatory lending occurs when a loan
contains a mandatory arbitration clause, which prohibits the bor-
rower from seeking judicial redress.58  The current trend of lend-
ers to impose binding predispute arbitration seems to be an
effort to prevent class action litigation and relief.59  According to
Sternlight, “If class actions are no longer an option, the vast ma-
jority of consumer claims involving relatively small sums of
money on an individual basis will be left without a remedy.”60
D. The Predatory Lending Aftermath
United States borrowers lose $9.1 billion annually to predatory
lending practices.61  These outrageous losses result from lenders
stripping equity and charging borrowers higher interest rates
52 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1268.
53 Id .
54 Id . See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & FED. RESERVE BD.,
JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LEND-
ING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT I (1998) [hereinaf-
ter HUD-FED JOINT REPORT], available at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf. (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
55 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1269-70.
56 Id . at 1270.
57 Id .
58 See  Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:  Con-
sumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System,  50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1191, 1191-92 (2001).
59 See  Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Ac-
tion, Will the Class Action Survive? , 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 59 (2000).
60 Id .
61 Stein, supra  note 1, at 2.
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than their credit histories would indicate is justified.62  As a re-
sult, residential foreclosure rates have dramatically increased.63
In Chicago, for example, the number of foreclosures of high cost
mortgages increased almost 500% from 1993 to 2001.64
Predatory lending practices are also tormenting Oregonians.
Between 1999 and 2002, 287 complaints alleging mortgage lend-
ing abuses were filed with the Department of Consumer and
Business Services.65  Although some opponents of more legisla-
tion have argued that the number of predatory lending incidents
is still insignificant,66 a recent settlement indicates that predatory
lending practices thrive in Oregon.67  In October 2002, House-
hold International, Inc. entered into a settlement of various
claims involving alleged unfair and deceptive lending practices
with a number of states, including Oregon.68  The total amount of
the settlement was $484 million.69  More than 5000 Oregon con-
sumers, who took out loans with Household during the period
from January 1999 through September 2002, are eligible to re-
cover a portion of Oregon’s share, which is at least $7 million.70
The foreclosure data described above demonstrates the devas-
tating economic consequences that predatory loans have for indi-
vidual borrowers and their families.  Most homeowners lose both
their homes and the equity they have built up over the years.
Even if borrowers keep up with their loan payments, the loans
continually strip them of their accrued equity and reduce their
household budget for other essential needs.  Homeowners are
then left with a substantial debt that they cannot afford.  The im-
pact of predatory lending extends beyond those individuals and
families who have been victimized.  Studies show that entire
neighborhoods are harmed by predatory lending practices.71  Eq-
62 Id .
63 See NAT’L TRAINING & INFO. CTR, OUTSIDE THE LAW:  HOW LENDERS DODGE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 7 (2003), available at  http://www.ntic-us.org/issues/cra/
outsidethelaw/Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
64 See id . at 8.
65 Hearing on H.B. 3088 , supra  note 2 (statement of Rep. Carolyn Tomei).
66 Id . (statement of Jim Markee, Or. Mortgage Lenders Ass’n).
67 Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, AG Myers Announces $484 Million Settle-
ment with Household International (Oct. 11, 2002), at  http://www.doj.state. or.us/
releases/rel101102.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
68 Id .
69 Id .
70 Id .
71 See  James H. Carr & Jenny Schuetz, Framing the Issue, Finding Solutions , in
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES:  ISSUES AND ANSWERS 5
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uity-stripping and foreclosures take cash out of neighborhoods
and shake the confidence of homeowners.72  Foreclosed homes
frequently remain vacant for a prolonged period of time, leading
to neighborhood instability, depressed property values, and in-
creased crime.73
II
BACKGROUND LAW
The desire to do something to stop the abuses in the lending
industry has led to federal legislation, regulatory proposals, and a
number of state bills.74  Legislation against predatory lending
takes a fairly consistent approach.  For example, most state legis-
lation contains prohibitions against certain activities by the
lender, disclosure requirements, and a condition that the lender
believe that the borrower can afford the loan.75  However, if
these state anti-predatory lending laws become too harsh or
overbearing on the credit market, a federal act could be passed
that preempts all state and local predatory legislation.
A. Federal Law
The main existing federal law on predatory lending is the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).76  In
1994, Congress passed HOEPA as an addendum to TILA.77
TILA’s purpose is to promote disclosures in consumer credit
transactions.78  Under TILA, lenders must make known the cost
of credit as both the finance charge and the APR.79  If the loan is
secured by a consumer’s home, then TILA, as a result of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board’s Regulation Z, includes additional disclo-
(2001), available at  http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/financial.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
72 Id .
73 See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra  note 24, at 25. R
74 Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation:
Federal Regulation, State Law and Preemption , 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78
(2002).
75 See id . at 82-84.
76 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa)-1639
(2000).  Regulations promulgated under HOEPA are found in Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.31-.32 (2004).
77 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000).
78 Id .; Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b).
79 12 C.F.R. § 226.31-.32.
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sures and provides for a three-day right of rescission.80
The purpose of HOEPA was to set out a system of “triggers,”
which activate disclosures and possible restrictions on loans that
exceed certain conditions.81  For high-cost, closed-end home
mortgages (other than purchase-money mortgages),82 HOEPA
requires additional disclosures three days before closing.83
Under these provisions, the lender must notify the borrower of
the APR, the dollar amount of the periodic payments, the size of
any balloon payments, the amount borrowed, and any charges
for optional credit insurance or debt-cancellation coverage.84
HOEPA lenders must also warn borrowers that they could lose
their homes.85  For adjustable-rate mortgages under HOEPA,
lenders must reveal that the interest rate, monthly payment, and
amount of the single maximum monthly payment could very
likely increase.86
Unfortunately for targeted borrowers, TILA and HOEPA
have weaknesses in the activities they prohibit and the relief they
provide.87  TILA was intended to standardize disclosures on the
total cost of credit, but a long list of closing costs is currently
excluded when computing finance charges and APRs.88  These
omissions are made worse because predatory lenders can pad
closing fees and add on expensive insurance without the cus-
tomer’s knowledge.89
Even though HOEPA fills some of TILA’s loopholes, its cov-
erage is too narrow.  HOEPA does not apply to purchase-money
mortgages, reverse mortgages, or open-end credit lines of any
kind.90  For home mortgages within its coverage, HOEPA only
applies if at least one of the following triggers is satisfied: the
APR at consummation exceeds the yield on Treasury securities
of comparable maturity plus 8% for first-lien loans (or 10% for
subordinate-lien loans); or the total points and fees exceed 8% of
the total loan amount or $400 (subject to annual indexing),
80 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32.
81 See  15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)-(4) (2000).
82 Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65, 605 (Dec. 20, 2001).
83 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a)-(b) (2000).
84 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c).
85 Id .
86 Id .
87 See HUD-FED JOINT REPORT, supra  note 55, at II. R
88 See id . at VII-XI.
89 See id . at XI & XIX.
90 See  15 U.S.C. § 1602(i), (w), (bb) (2000).
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whichever is greater.91  To evade HOEPA, a lender can simply
create a loan as an open-end extension of credit or keep the in-
terest and fees below the triggers.92  HOEPA’s triggers are so
high that most lenders, including predatory lenders, have no
trouble pricing their loans below the triggers.93  In 2000, about
1% of all subprime mortgage loans were estimated to fall under
HOEPA.94  By contrast, estimates of predatory lending and ac-
tual settlements entered into by large subprime lenders suggest
the true incidence may be considerably higher.95
On August 5, 2003, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency published a notice of proposed rulemaking.96  The proposal
added a new paragraph that prohibited a national bank from
making a loan “based predominantly on the foreclosure value of
the borrower’s collateral, rather than on the borrower’s repay-
ment ability, including current and expected income, current ob-
ligations, employment status, and other relevant financial
resources.”97  Unfortunately, the proposal does not influence a
financial company’s ability to make unethical loans.  It also al-
lows national banks to escape state contract laws98 and make real
estate loans without adhering to state laws limiting the “terms of
credit.”99  Therefore, state legislation has developed as a supple-
ment to perceived deficiencies in the federal law on predatory
lending.
B. State Law
More than half of the states have either recently passed or
have currently pending laws dealing with predatory lending.100
91 See  15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)-(4) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1) (2004).
92 See  Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d).
93 See, e.g ., HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra  note 24, at 85. R
94 Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Community and Consumer
Affairs Department Conference on Predatory Lending (December 6, 2000), at  http:/
/www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20001206.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2005).
95 See generally  Christopher A. Richardson, Predatory Lending and Housing Dis-
investment  (2003), available at  http://www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/seminar/spring03/
richardson.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
96 Bank Activities and Operations, Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904, 1905 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34).
97 Id . II.A.
98 Id . III.
99 MICHAEL MADISON ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 5:34 (rev.
ed. Supp. 2004).
100 Lampe, supra  note 75, at 82. R
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Several of these states have enacted HOEPA-like regulations
that force lenders to consider the borrowers’ ability to repay and
prohibit financing fees in high cost loans, balloon payments, di-
rect home-improvement disbursements, negative or non-amortiz-
ing loans, and prepayment penalties.101  Although it is beyond
the scope of this Comment to review all state and local legislation
on the issue of predatory lending, certain developments are
worth mentioning.
North Carolina was the first state to specifically address the
issue of predatory lending in its 1999 Anti-Predatory Lending
Law.102  The law defines general regulations for all loans,103 de-
velops a new class of high-cost loans,104 provides additional re-
strictions for those loans,105 and then establishes a way to enforce
the regulations.106  It prohibits the refinancing of home loans if
there is no tangible net benefit to the borrower, the financing of
single premium credit insurance, and prepayment penalties on
first-lien mortgages of less than $150,000.107  The law also con-
tains a flipping prohibition, which forces the lender to assess the
borrower’s need for the refinancing and decide if the refinancing
would benefit the borrower.108
Florida’s Fair Lending Act creates a category of “[h]igh-cost
home loan[s]”109 and subjects those loans to certain restric-
tions.110  The statute places restrictions on prepayment fees,111
increased interest rates in the event of a default,112 balloon pay-
ments,113 negative amortization,114 including the first payments
in the loan,115 encouraging default,116 and has anti-flipping provi-
101 Anna Beth Ferguson, Predatory Lending: Practices, Remedies and Lack of Ad-
equate Protection for Ohio Consumers , 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 627-32 (2000).
102 Richard R. Daugherty, Note, Will North Carolina’s Predatory Home Lending
Act Protect Borrowers from the Vulnerability Caused by the Inadequacy of Federal
Law? , 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 569, 592 (2000).
103 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A (2001) (creating primarily disclosure-
based protections).
104 Id . § 24-1.1E(a)(4)-(7).
105 Id . § 24-1.1E(b)-(d).
106 Id . § 24-1.1E(e).
107 Id . § 24-1.1A.
108 Id . § 24-10.2(c).
109 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 494.0079(6) (West Supp. 2004).
110 Id . § 494.00791.
111 Id . § 494.00791(1).
112 Id . § 494.00791(2).
113 Id . § 494.00791(3).
114 Id . § 494.00791(4).
115 Id . § 494.00791(5).
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sions.117  But, there is an uncommon provision in the statute.
The provision states that:
A lender making a high-cost home loan shall not engage in
any pattern or practice of extending high-cost home loans to
borrowers based upon the borrowers’ collateral without re-
gard to the borrowers’ ability to repay the loan, including the
borrowers’ current and expected income, current obligations,
and employment.118
Although there is a condition requiring lenders to consider the
borrower’s ability to repay the loan, the statute does not contain
the usual rebuttable presumption.119  Therefore, lenders in Flor-
ida who take a chance on a borrower must question whether a
court will find that their loan was made “without regard” to the
borrower’s ability to repay.
New York’s most recent anti-predatory law is also worth ana-
lyzing because Oregon’s House Bill 3088, which failed to pass in
2003, was modeled after the New York statute.120  New York’s
rule regarding the repayment ability clause tracks the opposite
approach from Florida.  New York’s statute allows the lender to
use a rebuttable presumption because reasonableness is a judg-
ment to be made in each loan.121  But, it has a higher standard of
proof than other state statutes for proving the borrower’s ability
to repay the loan before the lender gains this presumption.122
The New York statute applies to high-cost loans.  For example,
residential mortgages that have either an APR that is more than
8% above the interest rate for a comparable length Treasury Bill
or where points and fees exceed 5% of the total loan amount are
high cost loans.123  If the loan qualifies as a high-cost loan, the
New York statute prohibits call provisions,124 balloon payments
116 Id . § 494.00791(11).
117 Id . § 494.00791(9).
118 Id . § 494.00791(6).
119 See, e.g. , GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(8) (2003) (explaining that there is a rebut-
table presumption that the borrower is able to repay the obligation if the borrower’s
total monthly debts, including the loan, do not exceed 50% of the borrower’s
monthly gross income).
120 Hearing on H.B. 3088 , supra  note 2 (statement of Rep. Carolyn Tomei).
121 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(2)(k) (McKinney Supp. 2002).
122 Compare CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(f)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (permitting “any . . .
reasonable means”), with N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(2)(k) (allowing reliance only on
verified “detailed documentation of all sources of income and corroborated by inde-
pendent verification”).
123 Id . § 6-l(d), (g).
124 Id . § 6-l(2)(a).
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(fifteen years or sooner),125 negative amortization,126 higher de-
fault interest rates,127 modification and deferral fees (except
under certain circumstances),128 “oppressive” mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses,129 loans made “without due regard to repayment
ability” or without the borrower having received specified coun-
seling disclosures,130 the financing of single premium credit insur-
ance or debt cancellation benefits,131 the financing of points and
fees in excess of 3% of the principal amount of the loan,132 and
the charging of points and fees when the loan refinances a
lender’s own or an affiliate’s high-cost home loan.133  The New
York statute also prohibits “loan flipping,” that is, “refinanc[ing]
an existing home loan [with a high-cost home loan] when the new
loan does not have a tangible net benefit to the borrower consid-
ering all of the circumstances.”134
With its extensive list of requirements, the New York statute
places a substantial burden upon lenders engaged in the sub-
prime industry to ensure compliance.  Only time will tell whether
the prediction of the mortgage banking industry will come true
and lenders will flee the subprime market rather than be subject
to these new restrictions.
C. Assessment of the State Laws
Because North Carolina’s statute was the first to specifically
prohibit predatory practices, it has been the subject of many ex-
aminations that assess the consequences of anti-predatory lend-
ing legislation.135  The central question of these studies was
whether the law would eliminate consumers’ access to the very
credit they need to improve their economic situation.136
125 Id . § 6-l(2)(b).
126 Id . § 6-l(2)(c).
127 Id . § 6-l(2)(d).
128 Id . § 6-l(2)(f).
129 Id . § 6-l(2)(g).
130 Id . § 6-l(2)(k), (l).
131 Id . § 6-l(2)(h).
132 Id . § 6-l(2)(m).
133 Id . § 6-l(2)(q).
134 Id . § 6-l(2)(i).
135 Lew Sichelman, Predatory Lending Law Slowed Borrowing, Studies Say , CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 3, 2002, at F7.
136 Roberto G. Quercia, et al., The Impact of North Carolina’s Anti-Predatory
Lending Law:  A Descriptive Assessment 21-22 (June 25, 2003) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Texas Law Review), available at  http://www.kenan-
flagler.unc.edu/ assets/documents/CC_NC_Anti_Predatory_Law_Impact.pdf (last
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A study that reviewed 3.3 million subprime loans found that
there was a reduction in subprime originations from 1999 to
2000, but that the reduction was due to a decline in the number
of refinance originations which contain predatory terms.137  Spe-
cifically, the number of loans with prepayment penalties ex-
tending for three years or more dropped 72% in North Carolina,
while rising in neighboring states—by more than 260% in South
Carolina.138  Subprime refinance loans with balloon payments
dropped 53% in North Carolina, compared with a national de-
cline of only 15%.139
The study also found that the total volume of loans to North
Carolina borrowers with impaired credit (credit scores below
580) actually increased 31% after the law was fully implemented,
and subprime home purchase loans increased 43%.140  These
figures were comparable to those in surrounding states, which
did not have anti-predatory lending laws.141  Overall, the study
concluded that, after the North Carolina law was fully imple-
mented, the subprime market in North Carolina behaved essen-
tially as the law intended.142  There was a reduction of loans with
predatory terms without restriction in access to or increase in the
cost of loans to borrowers with blemished credit.143
D. Federal Preemption?
However, a state statute with expanding triggers and prohibi-
tions, vague standards, and onerous penalties could make emer-
gency credit more scarce and costly to those homeowners who
need it most.  It is possible that if a state’s anti-predatory law is
so harsh that it results in a drastic curtailment of lending in that
state, the federal government could adopt an anti-predatory
lending law that preempts state regulation.144  Congress’ power
to preempt state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the
visited Jan. 15, 2005) (finding that the North Carolina Anti-Predatory Lending Law
reduced the number of loans with predatory terms without inhibiting borrowers with
blemished credit from obtaining loans).
137 Id . at 21.
138 Id . at 20.
139 Id .
140 Id . at 20.
141 Id . at 17-19.
142 Id . at 21-22.
143 Id .
144 Lampe, supra  note 75, at 84-86. R
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United States Constitution.145  Congress may choose to take all
regulatory authority over a certain subject matter, or it may share
the field with the states.146
In 2003, United States Representative Bob Ney introduced the
Responsible Lending Act (H.R. 833) that, if passed, “shall pre-
empt any law” of any state or political subdivision that regulates
any type of mortgage (not just “high-cost mortgages”), “irrespec-
tive of whether such law affords greater protection.”147  But,
there is obvious opposition to such a preemption provision that
would infringe on state’s rights, restrict a state’s choice to opt
out, and possibly weaken existing federal law.148
The future of federal legislation is unclear, but it is evident that
the actions of some states and municipalities in creating unrealis-
tic laws that impact the availability of credit are viewed as an
invitation to federal preemption.149  Therefore, any new state leg-
islation should be patterned after HOEPA with clear, realistic,
and objective standards that do not unduly constrain mortgage
lending.
III
EXISTING LENDING LEGISLATION IN OREGON
As of January 16, 2004, Oregon had passed two laws that
sought to protect consumers from making bad loans with unethi-
cal lenders.150  In 2001, the Oregon Legislature enacted House
Bill 2764, which established educational requirements that lend-
ers must meet before dealing with borrowers who desire mort-
gage financing.151  This law provided an exemption from
education requirements for individuals who were licensed insur-
145 Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982).
146 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
147 Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 833, 108th Cong. § 104(a) (2003), available at
http://www.butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/directory/Federal/Congress/
Bills/HR%20833.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
148 See, e.g ., Press Release, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, NCRC
Opposes Ney’s “Responsible Lending Act” as Providing Few Consumer Protections
(Feb. 25, 2003), at  http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press_releases/ Oppose_Ney/
php (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
149 See  Lampe, supra  note 75, at 84-86. R
150 2003 State and Local Predatory Lending Bill Score Card, available at  http://
www.butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/directory/State/Legislature/ Bills/sbc/
2003%20State%20Predatory%20Lending%20Bill%20Score%20Card.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2005).
151 2001 Or. Laws Ch. 952 § 4 (2001).
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ance agents.152  The exemption was included to deal with the in-
surance agents who may only write a small number of loans as
part of their insurance business and, therefore, do not need the
educational skills of a full time mortgage loan officer.153  But af-
ter that law went into effect in January 2002, several instances
arose in which people who were full-time loan originators
avoided the Act’s education requirements because they also had
an insurance agent license.154
In 2003, House Bill 2682 was passed to enhance HB 2764, close
the loophole, and protect consumers in two additional ways: (1)
it compels full-time mortgage originators, who are also insurance
agents, to abide by the education requirements of all other loan
originators;155 and (2) it requires mortgage loan originators to
pass a criminal background check.156  A criminal background
check is important because the loan originator has access to the
most personal of financial information.  The legislation also re-
quires that mortgage bankers and brokers “conduct a criminal
records check of each individual the mortgage banker or mort-
gage broker employs or intends to employ as a loan origina-
tor.”157  Applicants for licensure must include with their
application evidence that each loan originator has completed an
entry-level training course,158 passed an examination,159 and for
certain individuals, completed continuing education.160  There-
fore, the legislation prevents a mortgage banker or broker from
employing an individual who has been convicted of a crime.161
Although these two laws improve a consumer’s chance of deal-
ing with a law-abiding lender, they fail to address the growing
problem of how to prohibit unscrupulous lenders from using un-
ethical and clearly abusive practices to prey on vulnerable citi-
152 Id . § 1(4)(e).
153 Work Session on H.B. 2682 of the House Comm. on Bus., Lab. and Consumer
Aff. , 2003 Leg., 72nd Sess. (Or. 2003) (statement of John McCulley, Or. Ass’n of
Mortgage Brokers) (Mar. 14, 2003), minutes available at  http://arcweb.sos.
state.or.us/archives/legislative/legislativeminutes/03/h/bus/HBLCA03142003.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
154 Id .
155 2003 Or. Laws ch. 526 § 2(1)(a).
156 Id . § 2(2)(d).
157 Id . § 3(1).
158 Id . § 4(4)(a)(A).
159 Id . § 4(4)(a)(B).
160 Id . § 4(4)(a)(B)(b).
161 Nat’l Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers, Word From Washington (Sept. 2003), availa-
ble at  http://www.lioninc.com/namb/washington (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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zens.  There is no mention in either HB 2764 or HB 2682 of how
to handle home mortgage loans that included abusive asset-based
lending, loan flipping, misleading omissions, prepayment penal-
ties, and mandatory arbitration clauses.  Thus, the existing Ore-
gon and federal lending laws are inadequate to end the
devastating social consequences of anti-predatory lenders.
IV
EXISTING REMEDIES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS IN OREGON
Unfortunately, ending predatory lending in Oregon will be dif-
ficult.  Identifying predatory loans can be problematic because
there is no full and comprehensive standard by which loans are
defined as either predatory or equitable.162  In addition, legiti-
mate subprime lenders will probably be harmed by, and there-
fore oppose, any attempt to regulate predatory lenders.163
Making overbroad legislation, because of a desire to create a
comprehensive definition of predatory lending, could cause a
chilling effect on the subprime market as it shuts out the very
consumers that the legislation was seeking to protect.164  There-
fore, balancing the support of ethical subprime loans against the
prevention of predatory loans results in a debate as to whether or
not additional laws are needed to prevent predatory lending.
A. Are There Currently Existing Alternatives to Legislation
Sufficient to Curb Predatory Lending Practices?
Essentially, neither the State of Oregon nor the federal gov-
ernment has sufficient laws to curb predatory lending.  As a re-
sult, victims of predatory loans must currently rely on an
assortment of statutes and common law rules, which were not
intended to address the harm caused by predatory lenders.
These remedies include:  (1) market solutions; (2) antifraud acts;
162 See REPORT OF THE STAFF TO CHAIRMAN GRAMM, COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES:  STAFF ANALYSIS OF
REGULATORS’ RESPONSES (Aug. 23, 2000), available at  http://banking.senate.gov/
docs/reports/ predlend/predlend.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
163 See Predatory Mortgage Lending:  The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs , 107th Cong.
378-79 (2001) (statement of George J. Wallace, Counsel for American Fin. Servs.
Ass’n), available at  2001 WL 857934.
164 See id .
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(3) contractual rules; (4) litigation; (5) consumer education; and
(6) antidiscrimination laws.
1. Market Solutions
Some industry leaders have argued that the best way to protect
both borrowers and the credit supply is to avoid further legisla-
tion and allow the market forces to prevent predatory lending.165
In their view, if predatory lending generates profits that surpass
the profits made by legitimate prime and subprime lending, legit-
imate lenders from those markets should enter and restore equi-
librium in the predatory lending market.166  Unfortunately, the
market will not correct.
Legitimate lenders have specific standards and reputational
concerns that keep them from entering the subprime market.167
For example, most legitimate lenders are accountable to share-
holders and regulators who are not willing to sustain lengthy
losses.168  Many of these legitimate lenders are also reputable in-
stitutional lenders who cannot disappear and reincorporate
under another name.169  In addition, the marketing strategies
that legitimate subprime lenders would have to use to contact the
typical victims of predatory lending would most likely conflict
with the firm’s business plans and culture.170  Predatory lenders,
on the other hand, have no problem using abusive tactics and can
either file for bankruptcy, dissolve, or form a new predatory
lending operation after suffering a loss.171
2. Antifraud Acts
Some groups suggest that certain existing legal remedies could
be used to punish predatory lenders.172  Using existing legal rem-
edies would allow a resolution of the issue without encumbering
165 Predatory Lending Practices:  Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Finance , 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Neill Fendly, President-Elect, Na-
tional Association of Mortgage Brokers), available at  http://financialservices.
house.gov/banking/ 52400fen.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
166 Id .
167 See  Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1361.
168 Id .
169 Id .
170 See id . at 1360-61.
171 Id .
172 Press Release, The Business Council of New York State, Inc., Council Opposes
Bill that Would Fundamentally Change Loans and Lending (Apr. 19, 2002), at  http:/
/www.bcnys.org/whatsnew/2002/0322lend.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2005).
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the already highly regulated lending industry with further regula-
tions.  Obviously, in cases of actual fraud, either criminal or civil
remedies can be pursued.  Common law fraud, however, does not
cover manipulation or misleading omissions.173  Therefore, Con-
gress, and all of the states, have passed unfair-and-deceptive-
acts-and-practices (UDAP) statutes,174 which prohibit unfair
practices affecting lawful trade or commerce.175  The federal act
gives enforcement of the statute to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), but does not offer a private right of action.176
Recently, the FTC has filed several enforcement actions
targeting predatory lending and alleging unfair and deceptive
practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).177
A few of those actions against predatory lenders have provided
borrowers with partial relief.178  However, due to the absence of
a private cause of action and political influences, private relief
under the FTCA is unlikely for most borrowers.
3. Contractual Rules
Even without fraud, certain contractual rules such as uncon-
scionability might invalidate predatory provisions in a loan, even
though most contract defenses go to defects in formation of as-
sent and not to disparities in bargaining power.179  Accordingly,
the non-English speaking consumer can point to the bargain’s
unfair formation and terms that occurred because the lender
took advantage of the consumer’s inability to comprehend the
English language contract.180  The unconscionability principle is
stated in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC):
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
173 See, e.g. , RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 537-45 (1977).
174 See generally JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DE-
CEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 1.1 (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
175 See  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000).
176 See SHELDON & CARTER, supra  note 175, § 9.1 & n.2. R
177 Federal Trade Commission, List of Law Enforcement Actions, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/02/chart2.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
178 See  In re Fleet Fin., Inc., 128 F.T.C. 479 (1999) (approving a $1.3 million settle-
ment for consumer redress and injunctive relief, based on charges that Fleet’s failure
to provide accurate, timely disclosure of the costs and terms of home-equity loans to
consumers and cancellation rights violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act).
179 See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, chs. 4-5, 9 (2d ed.
1990).
180 Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos:  Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace , 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1040-41 (1996).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE304.txt unknown Seq: 22 24-MAR-05 13:33
1102 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.181
This section applies to “transactions in goods” and not to
credit, but many courts have recognized the unconscionability
doctrine in non-UCC contract situations.182
Unconscionability has been defined as “an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties together with con-
tract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party.”183  But, many courts have been unwilling to find excessive
prices to be unconscionable, “without more.”184  Courts usually
require a showing of both procedural and substantive unfair-
ness.185  Courts also have legitimate apprehensions about their
ability to determine whether a particular price is reasonable.
Therefore, borrowers who have alleged unconscionable lending
practices have prevailed only with respect to nonprice terms.186
4. Litigation
Due to the recent wave of successful litigation against large
institutions that may have engaged in predatory practices, the be-
lief that current law will permit prosecution of predatory lenders
has gained support.187  Some scholars, however, suggest that
more legislation is still needed because large institutions are not
the main cause of the problem.188  Rather, they blame a small
number of unscrupulous lenders who are specially geared toward
maximizing profits through abusive loans.189  If a smaller group
of specialists is the source of the problem, large sweeping prose-
cutions will not be sufficient.190  In fact, such prosecutions might
181 U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1998).
182 FARNSWORTH, supra  note 180, § 4.28. R
183 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
184 See FARNSWORTH, supra  note 180, § 4.28. R
185 Bender, supra  note 181, at 1040. R
186 See, e.g. , Williams , 350 F.2d at 450.
187 For example, Household International Inc. recently proposed a $484 million
settlement to end prosecutions from a group of states.  Cassell Bryan-Low & Joseph
T. Hallinan, What’s Behind the Big Charge?  Take a Look at Household , WALL ST.
J., Oct. 23, 2002, at C1.
188 See  Engel & McCoy, supra  note 7, at 1289-96.
189 See id . at 1282-84.
190 A victory against predatory lending may not be helpful since these lenders are
usually not sufficiently capitalized to pay their judgment. See id . at 1290.
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actually worsen the problem by sending uneducated borrowers
away from slightly abusive, legitimate institutions, and into the
grasp of lenders whose total aim is to take the victims’ money.191
Therefore, even if present law has proven successful against
larger lenders, it is still not clear how useful it will be in combat-
ing the problem as a whole.
5. Consumer Education
Consumer education is another possible solution to the prob-
lem of predatory lending.  Educational initiatives attempt to con-
trol predatory lending by improving consumers’ lending
knowledge.192  The initiatives are designed to help consumers
gain a clearer understanding of their rights and obligations under
the terms of the loan.193  The idea behind educational initiatives
is that when consumers have a better understanding of what they
are signing, they can better negotiate equitable terms, or at least
understand their other options, and can then walk away if the
proffered terms are unfair.194  Educational initiatives have an-
other benefit of being less harsh on the actual loan process than
rules or standards.  This allows consumers to decide for them-
selves whether the offered terms are acceptable.195
Consumer education should be available for those borrowers
who want to be well-informed.  Education, however, is not suffi-
cient to end predatory lending either.  The initial challenge for
any educational campaign is finding the potential victim.196  But
even if a victim is found, there is no guarantee that she will un-
derstand the information or be able to use it when a predatory
lender comes knocking on the door.197
191 For example, a borrower might turn to a loan shark who does not act within a
legal framework.
192 One way to do this is to require counseling before a high-cost loan is made.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5(7) (2003).
193 See, e.g. , 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (a)(1)(A) (2000).
194 See  AARP, Avoiding Predatory Lenders , at  http://www.aarp.org/money/
consumerprotection / financinghomes / Articles / a2002 - 09 - 16 - ConsumerAdvocacy
HomeLoans.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
195 Id .
196 Cf . ABDIGHANI HIRAD & PETER M. ZORN, A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE IS A GOOD
THING:  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-PURCHASE HOME-
OWNERSHIP COUNSELING 1, 18 (2001) (stating that “telephone counseling had no
demonstrable effectiveness in reducing delinquency rates”), available at  http://
www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2003_conf_paper_session1_zorn.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2005).
197 Id .
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6. Antidiscrimination Laws
Other suggestions, based on civil rights themes, are novel, but
typically stretch far beyond existing jurisprudence of those
laws.198  As previously discussed, predatory lenders target mem-
bers of protected minority groups and the result is a disparate
impact on those people.199  Therefore, some victims of predatory
lending may have claims for disparate treatment,200 disparate im-
pact,201 or “pattern and practice”202 claims under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) or the Fair Housing Act
(FHA).203  The ECOA forbids lenders from discriminating in
mortgage and credit transactions by race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, age, or receipt of public assistance.204
The FHA prohibits discrimination in the financing of residential
real estate based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
handicap, or familial status.205
Even though both statutes permit private damages actions,206
very few victims of lending discrimination have brought claims
under these statutes.207  One reason for this is that many loan
applicants cannot recognize lending discrimination because they
are unaware of the factors contributing to the lenders’ deci-
sion.208  Even when borrowers realize that they have been dis-
criminated against, they may not understand that the lenders’
198 See  Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project:  Prescribing a
Cure for the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly , 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 28-29
(2000).
199 See supra  Part I.B.
200 See  Ronald K. Shuster, Lending Discrimination:  Is the Secondary Market
Helping to Make the “American Dream” a Reality? , 36 GONZ. L. REV. 153, 163-66
(2001).
201 Id . at 166-68.
202 See  Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination:  A Law
and Economics Analysis , 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 832 (1995) (proposing the use of
testing to detect patterns of discrimination).
203 Cf . Timothy C. Lambert, Fair Marketing:  Challenging Pre-Application Lend-
ing Practices , 87 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2196-2203 (1999) (suggesting the option of bringing
a marketing discrimination claim under federal law).
204 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2000).
205 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2000).
206 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (2000).
207 See, e.g ., Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth:  A Proposal to Simplify
Federal Mortgage Lending Discrimination Laws , 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 549
(1993) (noting that there has not yet been much private or public litigation under
ECOA).
208 See  Michele L. Johnson, Note, Your Loan is Denied, But What About Your
Lending Discrimination Suit?: Latimore v. Citibank Federal Savings Bank, 151 F.3d
712 (7th Cir. 1998), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 185, 215 (1999).
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tactics were unlawful under the FHA or ECOA.  Loan informa-
tion regarding how other applicants were treated could assist vic-
tims in establishing discriminatory treatment, but such
information is complicated and costly to formulate.209
The Department of Justice (DOJ), in 1992, brought its first
“pattern or practice” lawsuit under ECOA, claiming racial dis-
crimination against Decatur Federal Savings and Loan.210  The
action resulted in a consent decree in which Decatur agreed to
pay $1 million in loans to formerly rejected black applicants.211
As a result, the DOJ has prosecuted a number of similar cases
alleging lending discrimination,212 but its ability to prosecute
more cases is “hampered by staff shortages, the costly, time-con-
suming nature of compiling proof of discrimination and inevita-
ble shifts in political winds.”213  Moreover, proving every element
necessary for a civil rights suit is a rather circuitous and cumber-
some method of establishing that a loan was unfair.214
Thus, while some feel that predatory lending can be stopped
without major legislative changes, others disagree and suggest
that direct and effective legislation is needed.  Much recent legis-
lative activity seems to indicate that improvements in borrower
protection are essential to the goal of protecting vulnerable con-
sumers.215  All along, however, the goal of protecting consumers,
while protecting the credit infrastructure that they depend on, is
still at the forefront of the debate.216
B. More Legislation?
An effective solution must be one that reduces predatory lend-
209 See  Dane, supra  note 208, at 544. R
210 Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empower-
ment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial
Justice , 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1477 & n.53 (1994).
211 Id .
212 See, e.g. , Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory Ac-
cess to Loans, Credit, and Insurance:  An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Con-
sumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995 , 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 640-42 (1996).
213 Engel & McCoy, supra  note 8, at 1317. R
214 For example, discriminatory intent or impact must be shown before a fair
housing violation will be found.  Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One’s Own:  The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People With
Mental Disabilities , 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925, 979-80 n.325 (1994).
215 See supra  Parts II.A-B.
216 Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banking Agencies’ Guidance on Subprime
Lending:  Regulation with a Divided Mind , 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73, 107-09 (2002).
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ing without having too great an impact on the subprime lending
market.  Because current Oregon and federal laws, as well any
alternative remedies that do not involve more legislation, seem
to fail this balancing test by insufficiently protecting the bor-
rower, more legislation is the answer.  But the additional legisla-
tion must be realistic.  It needs to have objective, clear, and
comprehensible rules that can afford borrowers significant pro-
tections while still preserving the credit infrastructure.
In 2003, Oregon Representative Carolyn Tomei proposed Ore-
gon’s first anti-predatory law, House Bill 3088.217  It was based
on New York’s most recent anti-predatory lending law and would
have made it possible for the Oregon Department of Justice to
prosecute illegal predatory lending practices in all open-ended
credit plans.218  House Bill 3088 stated that: (1) lenders could not
accelerate or increase payments on high-cost loans at their own
discretion or increase interest rates after a high-cost loan is de-
faulted; (2) if the loan is a refinance loan, lenders could not
schedule payments more than twice the size of the previous pay-
ments, or encourage the borrower to default on the current loan;
(3) lenders could not charge fees for making changes to a high-
cost loan, charge fees outside their normal fee schedule, or in-
clude fees over 3% of the principal amount; (4) predatory lend-
ers could not mandate unfair arbitration, participate in loan
flipping, or make high-cost loans without regard to the bor-
rower’s ability to repay; (5) a lender under a high-cost loan could
not make direct payment to a contractor under a home improve-
ment loan; and (6) lenders would have to disclose a high-cost
loan to the borrower and provide a list of state-approved credit
counselors to the borrower before a high-cost loan could be
made.219
However, House Bill 3088 failed to pass.  Oregon legislators
most likely feared that their efforts to curb predatory practices
would have actually restricted credit access to the high-risk bor-
rowers that they intended to protect.220  New York’s law, after
which the Oregon bill was modeled, has been considered one of
the most problematic for both borrowers and lenders because it
significantly exceeds the coverage of other state laws and in-
217 Hearing on H.B. 3088 , supra  note 2 (statement of Rep. Carolyn Tomei).
218 Id .
219 Id .
220 Id . (statement of Jim Markee).
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cludes prohibitions and limitations on loan terms that go well be-
yond the federal HOEPA.221  It was not a good model for
Oregon’s first anti-predatory lending law to follow.
Instead, Oregon’s next legislation should take a lighter, more
reasonable approach that tracks both HOEPA and Florida’s Fair
Lending Act, and should implement the following reforms:
Cover home mortgage lending, reverse mortgage lending, and
open-ended transactions secured by real estate.
Create a homeowner protection unit in the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office and establish a new homeowner’s education pro-
gram in the Department of Commerce.
Limit balloon payments, call provisions, and negative amorti-
zation in high-cost home loans.
Limit prepayment penalties for the first three years of the
loan, increased interest rates after a default, and improper
payments to home improvement contractors.
Limit fees to modify, renew, extend or amend high-cost home
loans.
Prohibit flipping of home loans, in which refinancing worsens
the borrower’s financial position.
Require homeownership counseling for borrowers who seek
high-cost loans.
This is not a comprehensive list.  It is intended to illustrate how
public policy should respond to the pervasive abuses occurring in
the marketplace that cannot be addressed solely through im-
proved disclosure or more extensive financial literacy counseling.
The goal, therefore, is to create a system in which loans are ap-
propriately and affordably priced, and meet housing needs as
well as urgent consumer needs such as financing a medical emer-
gency.  Even Oregon lenders and merchants would likely support
such a bill if it mirrored the reasonable Florida law and had
fewer teeth than an alternate proposal.
CONCLUSION
Addressing predatory lending requires a balanced response.
Subprime lending has many desirable aspects, and Oregon
should not adopt draconian policies that extinguish or greatly
curtail legitimate subprime business.  At the same time, the state
must propose a solution to lending abuses.  Combating such
abuses calls for a comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy that
employs realistic anti-predatory legislation and consumer educa-
tion.  Therefore, the best way to protect both subprime borrow-
221 See  Lampe, supra  note 75, at 81-82. R
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ers and subprime lenders is to create a system of clear and
comprehensible rules that also affords significant protections
without constraining mortgage lending.
